by Ramsin Canon

The democratic road to socialism needs state power, so democratic socialists need to engage in and win elections. Why? Once the office is won, it can be used to win strategic reforms, move more people into working-class ‘for itself’ activity, and accelerate the break away from capitalism. For that to happen, elected officials need to be guided by a socialist theory of change and make choices based on information and experiences coming out of working-class activity.

Over the last decade or so, socialists have been bedeviled by electoral strategy. This is in part because we have been getting the order of operations wrong. If ‘accountability’ has to happen after the fact, your electoral strategy has already failed. It means the officeholder feels comfortably disconnected from the organization and the political program it has developed, and empowered to act in a way that directly conflicts with that program. Any accountability process is more likely to drive an even bigger division between the office and the organization.

In response to this reality, many democratic socialists have theorized how to develop ‘cadre’ candidates who will be disciplined by virtue of the fact of being ‘cadre’, and therefore less likely to act in a way that requires ‘accountability’. If the candidate owes their political development to the organization, goes this theory, they simply won’t break from the organization.

The problem is that this ignores institutional pressure. Starting as ‘cadre’ does not address the immense pressure on elected officials from formal party apparatuses, organized constituencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profits, and other state and non-state organs. Setting aside the very real phenomenon of opportunists, even the most earnest and sincere cadre candidate will only be able to resist that institutional pressure for so long until compromise builds on compromise and one day they find they are no longer cadre at all.

So what is the answer? What is our theory for engaging in elections and holding elected office? That is still unclear. Like one of those optical illusion drawings of a vase or two faces, the statement “democratic socialists need to engage in and win elections” can be interpreted one of two ways: that individual democratic socialists (the candidates) need to be elected to office, or that “democratic socialists” as a collective political body via campaigns need to engage in and win elections.

Unlike those optical illusions, though, there is actually one answer: the latter. The democratic road to socialism requires that the democratic socialist movement, consciously and as a body, determines the strategic way to engage in win, and collectively hold state power through elections.

If we can agree on this theory, we can agree that running cadre candidates may be the wrong way to think about accomplishing our goals. What we actually need to do is run cadre campaigns. Everything we need to achieve through our electoral work can be gained only by this approach: big-picture strategy, mutually reinforcing work, non-reformist reforms, victories for the working class, and wielding state power to bring about a rupture with capitalism.

A cadre campaign is one where the relationships needed to win and hold office are developed, managed and held by the organization, not the individual candidate; the candidate will always be in a weaker position than the organization. Chapters should pick offices where running the campaign and winning it will be based on the strength of the chapter’s relationships, not the candidate’s. Discipline and accountability will result from that, because conflict with the chapter will automatically jeopardize those relationships. It is not a question of what the chapter can ‘offer’ a candidate in terms of support or the candidate’s stated or apparent ‘loyalty’ to the organization. It is a matter of the practical power the chapter holds in a given campaign. It is our responsibility to build our power to the point where we can exercise it as the decisive factor in winning. The campaign, not the candidate, is the path towards accountable cadre.

The Relationships Needed to Win Power

A successful electoral campaign requires a web of political relationships: to funders, voting blocs, and institutions and organizations that provide these. The first are direct relationships and the second indirect.

Who can you call to raise money for an aldermanic election in Chicago? Those are direct relationships. Through your work on a local school council or other organizations, do you know 200 people who would vote for you? Those are direct relationships. A good candidate has both of those. A cadre candidate holds the same relationships the chapter primarily holds; a cadre campaign connects the relationships held by the organization to a specific electoral campaign. The organization’s endorsement (and the process by which it gets to that endorsement) is enough that it can lend its direct relationships to that candidate.

DSA’s challenge is to build relationships where a democratic decision of the membership results in activating them for a specific electoral campaign – and can also sever those relationships. Will the chapter’s union members build committees at their workplaces in support of a campaign? Will the branches reach out to community organizations and leaders to proselytize for the candidacy? Will the chapter convincingly pitch the campaign to regular PAC donors who are likely chapter members?

Traditional politics means that leaders of organizations confer and decide on good candidates and good races. That is not a viable long-term strategy for the democratic road to socialism. If a DSA chapter’s relationship is with leaders of a union, for example, that is helpful and healthy; but the real relationship needs to be ‘body-to-body’ – between organizational memberships. DSA members need to make the case to their union siblings and their leadership to make an endorsement; that is how individuals are minimized in the relationship, and discipline and accountability become built into the electoral strategy.

Within a chapter, the candidate is not cadre merely by being chosen, or really liking socialism. The candidate is cadre by virtue of their standing in the chapter and the relationships they’ve developed through their work. The chapter can send out fundraising e-mails, but if there is no membership buy-in or relationship with the candidate, they won’t bear much fruit.

The Relationships Needed to Hold Power

Once an election is won, a democratic socialist holds power; but do democratic socialists hold it? This is why there actually is a right way to see the puzzle. If the candidate’s relationships are held in common by the organization, the SIO (socialist in office) holds formal power, but practical power is collectively held by the organization.

The ends will look like the means, always. The way we win power will shape the way power is held and used; the last decade of DSA electoral work bears this out. Fighting over discipline and accountability are just different forms of frustration over failure to develop and execute cohesive long-term electoral strategy.

No DSA chapter has the resources or relationships to win major elected offices on its own; for the foreseeable future, we will need to bring in other organizations and high-visibility figures to be part of a winning coalition. The question is not whether that has to happen, or whether it will require some degree of compromise on our message. That is inevitable, and denying it only marginalizes us by choice. The question is whether the political relationships that bring those coalitions together are held by the organization collectively, and therefore whether the membership has made the democratic decision to accept compromise or change.

It should never be the case that the leaders of a chapter are worried about damaging their relationship with an elected official. It should always run in the other direction. That will happen when the SIO knows that if they piss off the teachers’ union too much, it will reverberate into the DSA chapter and vice versa. That reverberation can only happen when members are kept informed and have the opportunity to deliberate and discuss. When that happens, that is when accountability becomes real. The accountability happens before the fact, not after.

“I am Awake”

In neurologist Oliver Sacks’ book Musicophilia, he writes about Clive Wearing, who suffered from anterograde amnesia and was unable to form new memories, and describes how Wearing would write in his journal, “I am awake” each time he came back into consciousness realizing he could not remember anything he had been doing. Wearing lived in a “continuous present.” DSA chapters all over the country seem to get stuck in these continuous presents, with little institutional memory of campaigns past, of their relationship with various SIOs, and with other organizations. With each new membership bump or leadership turnover, we, too, are awake.

This lack of institutional memory is partly because of our all-volunteer, high-leadership turnover structure, but it is also because there is a culture of quiet around SIOs and other organizations. We’re often afraid to talk about the dysfunctional or non-existent relationship with this or that “DSA elected” because we do not want to alienate them or harm an already poor relationship. In other cases, the relationship is good but precarious, because the chapter knows that other than create mild embarrassment for a couple of news cycles, there isn’t much it can do to pressure an SIO.

Being more open about the nature and history of these relationships is easier said than done, but it is important for experienced chapter leaders to discuss these things with newer members, and for those members to seek out this history in order to understand the challenges ahead of them. Otherwise, we are constantly waking up, living in an eternal present, doomed to make the same mistakes over and over.

This phenomenon is particularly damaging to any meaningful electoral strategy, because the SIOs have stability and continuity our organization lacks. As a result, not only can this phenomenon reverse the flow of accountability, but it can harm the SIO project itself, as electeds feel they cannot rely on the organization to provide resources they need – volunteers, policy experts, donors, and organizers – to move their constituencies around a program.

There’s no shame in admitting that while CDSA’s support may have tipped the scale in aldermanic elections of the past, it was neither necessary nor sufficient to be the only factor. 25th Ward alderman Byron Sigcho-Lopez is the SIO who has maintained a meaningful and productive relationship with CDSA, but his relationships in Pilsen were already deep before his winning 2019 campaign. He had strong relationships with an influential local union of which he had been a member, and he had been director of a highly visible and well-respected community organizing group. Byron’s ideological and personal commitment to growing socialism, and his understanding of what only socialist organizing can do, has kept him close to the chapter and its membership, but – quite reasonably – he also knows that to stay in office and potentially grow beyond it, he needs a broad political base, and, as any elected official would be, he is very aware of how he won his two terms.

In New York City, the story of Zohran Mamdani’s capture of the mayoralty is instructive to a degree. Mamdani was an active member of the Queens branch of the chapter; his first electoral work in leadership was for a NYC-DSA-endorsed candidate, Father Khader El-Yateem, in a campaign where El-Yateem lost with a respectable 31% of the vote. Mamdani surely developed relationships in the course of that campaign, but having operated on the campaign through NYC-DSA, they were not his relationships alone. His experience in electoral campaigns revolved around NYC-DSA’s electoral program, including working on Tiffany Caban’s Queens district attorney race. As NYC-DSA grew stronger in these constituencies, it became more possible to win a statehouse race—which is exactly what Mamdani did in 2020, in a district that overlaps with Caban’s current seat. Even after winning, Mamdani attended NYC-DSA meetings and relied on its members for organizing activity and the ability to connect him to labor struggles they were involved with. Interestingly, as NYC-DSA developed its electoral strategy, Mamdani advocated for the “1234” proposal which would have welded SIOs closer together through common messaging and data sharing. A narrower CDSA version of 1234 was defeated in part due to opposition from supporters of Chicago SIOs who were against the idea of sharing of campaign data.

Mamdani communicated to NYC-DSA that he would not run for mayor if he could not win its support for that campaign, and set about winning over the various factions in the chapter. This was an acknowledgment that he would need major organizational mobilization to make his campaign viable in the early stages, but it also recognized that his personal relationships to donors, volunteers, and labor and community organizations were insufficient to get him the early momentum he would need to compete. Only an organizational expression of his viability could do that, and NYC-DSA was the organization that could accomplish that. The activity of DSA members in United Auto Workers Region 9A won him a crucial early endorsement, and NYC-DSA activity in other unions coalesced groups of members into informal “[X] for Zohran” committees inside those unions that could fundraise, identify volunteers, and agitate for endorsements, as with the United Federation of Teachers and the AFSCME Council of public sector workers. These relationships not only help a candidate, but also undermine other candidates who try to force union or community leaders to make “pragmatic” endorsements against the will of their membership. A chapter needs to be able to deploy these kinds of activities and relationships for a campaign in order to have the result be cadre-in-office SIOs.

The challenge for NYC-DSA, should Mamdani win, will be related directly to whether they as an organization have the resources and relationships necessary to maintain their place in a governing coalition, or whether they will be rapidly displaced by more powerful institutions.