The Ukraine war shows that instead of a small amount of the best equipment, countries need a lot of less-impressive gear, a Ukrainian industry rep said.
I get what you are saying, but there is a huge flaw in your logic here. You are treating military ventures, particularly WWII military ventures, as if they have a quality assurance team with statistically controlled practices and a feedback mechanism that allows them to make adjustments and understand what they are doing, or why it is effective or ineffective, or if it the effect justifies the costs. They did not, and to some degree, still don’t.
The U.S. still hadn’t even figured out by WWII that it is a really good idea to have troops stationed behind the front lines when pushing on an offensive in order to regroup scattered soldiers, which left multiple divisions scattered on offensive thrusts and lead to the infamous moments like what was portrayed in “A Bridge Too Far” or in the Hurtgen Forest, a mistake that they literally repeated from WWI in the Aragonne Forest. In that vein, they did multiple troop air drops, which which have repeatedly and soundly been shown to be ineffective at best, and completely wipe out a combat unit at worst, despite what Hollywood and video games would have you believe, because of what military planners thought, which was mostly that it seemed bad ass.
The bombings absolutely caused chaos in Germany and took their toll on the population, but their actual effect on German industrial production was relatively limited in hindsight, especially when compared to the bombing campaigns in things like the Second Gulf War. It is unclear if it could have been considered an effective campaign from that measure. But generals love their planes and destroying civilian infrastructure, and bombers and jets are admittedly pretty cool to look at and watch fly.
I get what you are saying, but there is a huge flaw in your logic here. You are treating military ventures, particularly WWII military ventures, as if they have a quality assurance team with statistically controlled practices and a feedback mechanism that allows them to make adjustments and understand what they are doing, or why it is effective or ineffective, or if it the effect justifies the costs. They did not, and to some degree, still don’t.
The U.S. still hadn’t even figured out by WWII that it is a really good idea to have troops stationed behind the front lines when pushing on an offensive in order to regroup scattered soldiers, which left multiple divisions scattered on offensive thrusts and lead to the infamous moments like what was portrayed in “A Bridge Too Far” or in the Hurtgen Forest, a mistake that they literally repeated from WWI in the Aragonne Forest. In that vein, they did multiple troop air drops, which which have repeatedly and soundly been shown to be ineffective at best, and completely wipe out a combat unit at worst, despite what Hollywood and video games would have you believe, because of what military planners thought, which was mostly that it seemed bad ass.
The bombings absolutely caused chaos in Germany and took their toll on the population, but their actual effect on German industrial production was relatively limited in hindsight, especially when compared to the bombing campaigns in things like the Second Gulf War. It is unclear if it could have been considered an effective campaign from that measure. But generals love their planes and destroying civilian infrastructure, and bombers and jets are admittedly pretty cool to look at and watch fly.